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Abstract
We show that a calibrated dynamic skill accumulation model allowing
for comparative advantages, can explain the weak (or negative) eects of
schooling on productivity that have been recently reported (i) in the micro
literature on compulsory schooling, ii) in the micro literature on estimat-
ing the distribution of ex-post returns to schooling, and (iii) in the macro
literature on education and growth. The fraction of the population more
ecient at producing skills in the market than in school is a pivotal quantity
that determines the sign (and magnitude) of dierent parameters of inter-
est. Our model reveals an interesting paradox; as low-skill jobs become more
skill-enhancing (ceteris paribus), IV estimates of compulsory schooling be-
come increasingly negative, and ex-post returns to schooling (inferred from
a Roy model specication of the earnings equation) become negative for an
increasing fraction of the population. This arises even if each possible input
to skill production has a strictly positive eect. Finally, our model provides
a foundation for the weak (or negative) eect education on growth measured
in the empirical literature.
Key Words: Compulsory Schooling Reforms, Dynamic Skill Accumula-
tion, Comparative Advantages, Returns to schooling, Education and Growth,
Dynamic Discrete Choice, Dynamic Programming.
JEL Classication: I2, J1, J3.
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1 Introductory Remarks
In this paper, we show that a calibrated dynamic skill accumulation (DSA)
model allowing for comparative advantages, can reconcile many results re-
ported in the vast and heterogenous literature on estimating the economic
benet of schooling.1 In particular, it may explain the incidence of very low
(possibly negative) estimates that have been reported in the recent literature
on mandatory schooling (Devereux and Hart, 2010). The model also sheds
light on the reasons why ex-post returns to schooling are found to be negative
for a subset of the US population (Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman, 2003,
and Heckman, Humphries, Urzua and Veramendi, 2011). Finally, it indirectly
provides a theoretical foundation for the very weak (or negative) correlation
between economic growth and education (Bils and Klenow, 2000).2
As will become clear later, the dierence between the rates at which
labor market experience and education may be used to produce new skills
is a pivotal quantity that drives the sign (and magnitude) of IV estimates,
and other parameters measuring the eect of schooling on productivity. We
show how negative IV estimates, as well as negative ex-post returns inferred
from a Roy model specication of the earnings equation, may arise even if
each possible input to skill formation (education and dierent types of labor
market employment) has a strictly positive eect.
Our approach is objective. We neither address the relevance of IV estima-
tion strategies, nor its statistical performance.3 Indeed, our approach does
not even require imputing pre-estimation objectives to empirical economists
using IV methods.4 Put dierently, our objective is to show how an education
1Throughout the paper, the terms \return to schooling", "treatment eect of schooling
on earnings", and \economic benet of schooling" may be used interchangebly.
2In this literature, economists attempt to capture the causal eect of education on
growth rates, after controlling for cross-country dierences in capital stock, and well as
other factors explaining growth.
3For opposite views regarding IV estimation strategies, the reader can consult Keane
(2010), Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2005), Deaton (2008) and Imbens (2009).
4For instance, anecdotal evidence suggests that some economists interpret their es-
timates as a direct conditional eect of schooling for some population (thereby relying
explicitly on the IV identifying moment condition), while others may believe that they
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policy intervention may at the same time increase educational attainments
and reduce average earnings. We use IV methods simply because it is the
main tool used in the literature on compulsory schooling.
In the paper, we construct a synthetic dynamic skill accumulation (DSA)
data generating process with heterogenous agents. The model is in the spirit
of Ben-Porath (1967), and has similarities with other dynamic skill accu-
mulation models analyzed in the literature (Heckman, Lochner and Taber,
1998, Keane and Wolpin, 1997). We claim that a properly constructed DSA
model is the natural benchmark to analyze life cycle data on schooling and
earnings.5
Our model has a relatively simple structure. Forward looking agents are
endowed with an individual specic level of academic ability and allocate
their time between schooling and work, over an exogenously given time hori-
zon. Individuals can either work in a job that entails a high accumulation
rate of human capital or in a job that oers a lower rate. We sometimes refer
to the employment status characterized by a low skill-accumulation rate as
the\low-skill" job. Our terminology should not be confused with the usual
meaning of low-skill vs high-skill jobs, which typically refers to either a skill
requirement, or to a pay level. In our model, two individuals with the same
level of accumulated human capital earn the same amount. However, their
incremental skill acquisition is function of the state occupied.6 As is usually
done in the structural literature, we do not distinguish between ex-ante and
ex-post returns and assume that individuals have full information about the
skill accumulation technology.7
As in Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998), we dissociate the earnings
process from the learning process. The dynamics arise because the psychic
cost of occupying the type of employment that produces more human capi-
estimate some total eect (direct and indirect eects) and ignore "identication" issues.
5The classical Ben-Porath model provides the structural foundation of the popular
Mincer equation and has also been used in the Economic Growth literature (Lucas, 1988).
As well, dynamic skill accumulation models play a central part in the recent literature on
child development (Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach, 2011).
6Our characterization of the employment status is therefore a discrete multi-state ver-
sion of the classical Ben-Porath model. The term \job" does not refer to an employer-
employee relatonship. Instead, it characterize dierent states which entail a dierent
investment rate.
7Cunha, Heckman and Navarro (2005) analyze a framework where ex(post returns may
diverge from ex-ante returns.
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tal depends on both accumulated human capital and intrinsic ability (skills
reduce the psychic cost of acquiring new skills).8 Comparative advantages
are introduced in the model by assuming dispersion in academic abilities
(in the skill formation technology parameters). In particular, there exists a
sub-population endowed with low academic ability, which is more ecient at
producing skills in the market (in the low-skill job) than in school. Although
it would be easy to introduce dispersion in the rate at which individuals pro-
duce new skills in a low skill job, it turns out that our nding is more clearly
illustrated with such a simpler parameterization.9
To stress the specic implications of compulsory schooling compared to
other educational interventions, we analyze three distinct types of interven-
tions; those that stimulate schooling attainments by aecting the net utility
of attending school (education subsidies), those that do it by setting a min-
imum school leaving age (compulsory schooling), and those that create a
disincentive to invest in schooling, by subsidizing low-skill employment. All
of them are anchored in the DSA model.
In the paper, we raise and answer the following questions.
 What are the implications of comparative advantages for IV estimates
of the treatment eect of schooling, which are obtained from
{ changes in compulsory schooling?
{ education subsidies?
{ low-skill employment subsidies?
 Can a dynamic skill accumulation model accommodate
8Actually, the main results reported in the paper would also prevail in the case where
schooling has no dynamic eect on post-schooling skill formation. We chose to introduce
the dynamic structure in order to be realistic. Equally, the main results would also go
through if we assumed, in line with the literature on formal training, that investing in
training reduces current earnings.
9One implication of our model is that those who have comparative advantages in aca-
demic activities (those who are more educated and work in jobs that produce more skills)
earn more than those who work in low skill jobs (aside from purely random shocks). How-
ever, because one of our focus will be on policies that prevent the bottom tail of the
ability distribution to act based on their comparative advantages (compulsory schooling),
allowing for some of the non-academic types to earn more than some of the acdemic types,
would only reinforce our ndings.
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{ the incidence of negative IV estimates for compulsory schooling?
{ the incidence of negative (ex-post) returns to schooling for a cer-
tain fraction of the population?
{ the weak eect of education on growth found in the empirical
literature?
The main results of the paper may be summarized as follows. The in-
cidence of negative IV estimates, which are generated from educational in-
terventions targeting the bottom tail of the ability distribution, is a natural
implication of the existence of comparative advantages. Essentially, IV es-
timates are bound to lie below zero as long as those individuals, who are
more eective at producing skills in the market than in school, are also those
aected by the policy. This is the case with compulsory schooling interven-
tions, but generally not with other interventions.
The negative eect of compulsory schooling on earnings is perfectly con-
sistent with the existence of negative ex-post returns, which have been re-
ported in the literature on estimating distribution of returns (Carneiro, Hansen,
and Heckman, 2003, and Heckman, Humphries, Urzua and Veramendi, 2011).
It is also consistent with the structural dynamic programming literature on
schooling and earnings (Belzil and Hansen, 2007, Belzil and Hansen, 2002,
and Keane and Wolpin, 1997).10 The earnings loss displayed by compulsory
schooling policies is the logical consequence of a policy that forces those who
are endowed with negative returns to take actions that do not reect their
comparative advantages.
Our model reveals an interesting paradox. As we increase (counterfac-
tually) the rate at which low-skill jobs produce new skills (leaving both the
distribution of treatment eects of schooling and the return to high-skill jobs
unchanged), IV estimates of compulsory schooling become increasingly neg-
ative, and ex-post returns to schooling become negative for an increasing
fraction of the population. In other words, the incidence of negative IV es-
timates is the by-product of the dierence between the rate at which skills
are produced in school and in the market (in low skill jobs). Negative IV
10In the structural literature, post-schooling accumulation is usually exogenous and
modeled through a Mincer type of function (quadratic in experience). Keane and Wolpin
(1997) is an exception. The authors endogenize post-schooling choices by allowing indi-
viduals to move freely between blue-collar and white-collar occupations.
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estimates may arise even if each possible input (education, low-skill job and
high-skill job) has a strictly positive eect on skill formation.11
The residual parts of the paper are organized as follows. In Section 2, we
lay-out the behavioral model. The 3rd section is devoted to the construction
of the treatment and control groups. In the 4th section, we implement IV
methods on our benchmark model, using instruments generated from both
education subsidies and compulsory schooling. In Section 5, we use various
simulations to provide a structural interpretation for the incidence of nega-
tive IV estimates of compulsory schooling changes, and provide an intuitive
discussion of our main results. In Section 6, we discuss the potential links be-
tween our results and dierent literatures. The nal section oers concluding
remarks.
2 The Behavioral Model
The model is in the spirit of the classical Ben-Porath model (1967), although
it also has some fundamental dierences. As do Heckman, Lochner and Taber
(1999), we construct a model that separates the schooling decision from the
post-schooling accumulation process.12 In line with the structural dynamic
schooling literature (Keane and Wolpin, 1997, Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999,
Belzil and Hansen, 2002, and Heckman and Navarro, 2006), we assume that
post-schooling skill acquisition is also aected by psychic components. The
dynamics of skill formation arises because schooling reduces the psychic cost
of learning further skills.
To choose the preference parameters we relied mostly on the structural
literature, in order to obtain a realistic range of the relevant parameters
11This nding discloses an obvious commonality with theoretical ndings of Heckman
and Vytlacil (2005), who show how misspecication of the rst stage of a linear IV model,
may lead to estimates completely disconnected from the treatment eects of interest. We
address this issue in Section 6.
12In the Ben-Porath model, the cost of skill accumulation is suered in terms of current
earnings reduction. This assumption, coupled with other technical aspects (continuous
choice variable, continuous time, concavity), imply several features that are typically not
supported by schooling/earnings data. For instance, earnings do not jump suciently
beyond school completion (the fraction of time spent learning declines only gradually),
and earnings growth rates are highly persistent.
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(when possible). Then, we simulated the model and adjusted the parameters
until the nal values enabled us to match the population characteristics or
the population moments that we stated as desirable.
2.1 Model Structure
The baseline model is a stochastic dynamic discrete choice model of labor
supply/human capital accumulation over the life-cycle. There are 50 periods
to allocate between the 3 mutually exclusive states; schooling (s), work with
a low rate of skill accumulation (e), and work with a high rate of skill accu-
mulation (a). We sometimes refer to state e as the \low skill" job, thereby
referring to its associated skill accumulation rate (as opposed to a skill re-
quirement), as opposed to an employer-employee relationship.
The choices are summarized in the binary indicators, dtk, where dtk = 1
when option k (s; e; a) is chosen at date t. The variables corresponding to
the capitalized letters (St; Et; At) are used to measure the number of periods
accumulated in each state. There is a maximum of 16 years of schooling
attainable.
In observational data, the pendant of state e could be full time employ-
ment with learning by doing, while state (a) could represent work, with
on-the-job training. The distinction between Employment (e) and Work and
Training (a) is therefore in the intensity of human capital accumulation (a is
the high intensity mode).
Individuals are risk neutral and maximize the expected value of lifetime
net earnings, over the entire life-cycle. The state-specic utilities are dened
below. As is common in the structural literature, we assume that individuals
have full information about the skill accumulation technology.
2.2 School
The utility of individual i, at time t; who attends school (state s), denoted
U sit; is
U sit = 
s
i + 
s
1  I(St  4) + s2  I(5  St  8) +
s3  I(9  St  12) + s4  I(13  St  16) +
s5  I(dt 1;s = 0) + "Sit (1)
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where I(:) is the indicator function. The parameters s1; 
s
2; 
s
3 and 
s
4 cap-
ture the variation in the utility of attending school with grade level. These
parameters reect tuition costs and the like. The parameter S5 captures
the psychic cost of attending school for those who would have interrupted
their education. The term Si represents individual heterogeneity in taste for
schooling (academic ability). Finally, "Sit is a purely stochastic shock.
2.3 The Dynamics of Skill Accumulation
We assume that activities generating skill formation entail some psychic
cost.13 Individuals who accumulate skills, can do so while achieving a high
level of earnings. However, to do so, they must absorb a reduction in net
utility.
The utility of work and learning, U eit; depends only on the wage rate
(learning on the job is costless). The utility of work and training, Uait; is
dened as the dierence between the wage rate and the monetary equivalent
of the psychic cost, Cait(). U
e
it, U
a
it; and C
a
it(); are given by the following
equations;
U eit = Wit (2)
Uait = Wit   Cait(Sit) (3)
Cait() = c
a
0i + c1a  Sit + "ait (4)
and where c1a captures the eect of accumulated schooling on the cost (or
disutility) of work and training. We assume that c1a is a negative parameter.
14
The "j0its are stochastic shocks.
13In the structural schooling choice literature (Keane and Wolpin, 1997, Eckstein and
Wolpin, 1999, and Belzil and Hansen, 2002), it is well known that individual decisions can
hardly be rationalized without introducing unobserved heterogeneity aecting the utility
of attending school (the consumption value of schooling).
14Because c1a is negative, we implicitly assume a form of complementarity between
schooling and on-the-job human capital accumulation. Heckman, Lochner and Taber
(1998) assume a similar learning technology.
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2.4 The Earnings Equation
The earnings equation is given by the following expression:
logWit = wit =  + 
s
i  Sit + e  Eit + a  Ait + "wit (5)
where Wit represents earnings at time t,  is the intercept term, 
s is the
treatment eect of schooling on earnings, e is the eect of employment, a is
the eect of employment with training, and "wit is a random shock (described
below). At the expense of repeating ourselves, we stress that the current gross
earnings are not aected by the state occupied. However, both net earnings
(actual earnings minus psychic costs) and the amount of skill investment are
function of the type of job occupied.15
It is convenient to separate schooling, and post-schooling accumulation,
and to re-write the wage equation as
wit =  + 
s
i  Sit + 'it
where
'it = 
e  Eit + a  Ait + "wit (6)
2.5 The Bellman Equations
Given the Markovian structure of the model, the solution to the problem is
obtained using recursive methods, and optimal choices may be characterized
by a Bellman equation (Bellman, 1957).
For each possible choice, there is a specic value function, V kt (
t); equal
to
V kt (
t) = U
k
t + EmaxfV 1t+1(
t+1); ::V Kt+1(
t+1) j dkt = 1g
or, more compactly, as
V kt (
t) = U
k
t + EVt+1(
t+1 j dkt = 1)
where  is the discount factor, and where 
t is the set containing all state
variables known by the agent at t:
15A alternative approach would be to assume that accumulating skills requires formal
training, and that current earnings are reduced when the high accumulation state is oc-
cupied. However, this would have no inuence on the results reported in the paper.
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2.6 Comparative Advantages and Random Shocks
To proceed, we follow the structural literature that estimates distributions
of treatment eects of schooling (Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman, 2003, and
Belzil and Hansen, 2007), and assume that the eect of schooling on log
earnings is subject to cross sectional dispersion. We follow more specically
Belzil and Hansen (2007) with respect to the distribution of s; because it is
the only paper that allows for a distribution of treatment eects of school-
ing in conjunction with a separate post-schooling accumulation technology
(a Mincer model).16 The distribution ranges from 0.005 to 0.12, and the
population average eect is equal to 0.06.
The heterogeneity distribution, Hi(:), is specied as a multi-variate dis-
crete distribution with R vectors of support points;
r = fSr ; ca0r; sr; prg for r = 1; 2; ::R (7)
where pr is the population proportion of type r: The full distribution is
displayed in Table A1 (in appendix).
The vector f"sit; "eit; "ait; "witg is composed of i.i.d. mutually independent
random shocks. Each one follows a Normal distribution with mean 0 and
variance (k) for k = s; e; a; w:
2.7 Model Calibration and Solution
To implement the models, we experimented with the parameters of the utility
of attending school so to obtain desirable features. In the end, we use the
following values: s1 =  3; s2  7; s3 =  12; s4 =  14; and s5 =  18. The
return to employment (set to 0.015) and training (set to 0.03) are chosen to
reect the fact that human capital accumulation is more intensive in state a
than in state e. They also ensure that the average life-cycle earnings growth
will lie between 1% and 2% per year (a well known stylized fact for the US).
To introduce some dynamics in the skill accumulation process, we set c1a
to 0.50 (each year of schooling reduces the psychic cost of schooling by 50
cents).
In order to allow for a high degree of selectivity on persistent heterogene-
ity, we set the standard deviations of all random shocks to 0.35
16For instance, in Keane and Wolpin (1997), the returns to schooling are occupation
specic as opposed to individual specic.
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The discount factor is set to 0.95 As is relatively common in the literature,
we solve the Bellman equations using simulated realizations of the random
shocks, for each single type separately. Our solution method is exact to the
extent that we solve value functions for each point in the state space (we do
not use any approximation or interpolation methods).
3 The Control and Treatment Groups
3.1 Control Group
To generate the control group, we simulate 2,500 realizations of the full vector
of random shocks for those types with density 0.05, and 5,000 for the three
types that have density equal to 0.10. We therefore end up with 50 years of
choices and wage outcomes for 50,000 individuals. An individual is dened
as the conjunction of (i) a heterogeneity type and (ii) a specic history of
random shocks. Throughout the paper, it is convenient to think of the time
horizon as covering choices made between age 15 and 65.
As documented in Belzil and Hansen (2010), simulated data from the
control group display all the desired features.17 Descriptive statistics of the
number of periods spent in each state are found in Table A2. The average
schooling attainment is equal to 6.5 years, and as normally expected, the
incidence of training (high accumulation state) is smaller ( 6 years on average)
than regular employment (37 years on average).
3.2 Treatment Groups
All of those education policies that we consider, have empirical relevance.
Practically every developed country has, at one stage, implemented manda-
tory schooling policies. Many countries have also introduced policies that
favor enrollment into higher education.18 Finally, the third policy, which
consists of subsidizing low-skill jobs, raises interest for both technical and
17Those features include schooling being located in the early phase of the life-cycle, and
the incidence of the intensive human capital accumulation state declining with age.
18In practice, this may be achieved by implementing tuition subsidies, scholarship funds,
or simply constructing universities, colleges, and the like.
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economic reasons. Because empirical labor economists practically never con-
sider experiments that reduce schooling attainments, it is interesting to com-
pare the low-skill employment subsidy to those interventions targeting an
increase in schooling. At an economic level, an employment subsidy is par-
ticularly relevant for countries that want to reduce the \crowding out" in
their university system, in favor of professional education programs closely
integrated to the labor market. This is the case in Europe, where higher
education is heavily subsidized.19
In order to build the treatment groups, we proceed as we did for the
control groups and we simulate 50 years of choices and wage outcomes under
each policy intervention. We end up with 100,000 observations (50,000 in
control and 50,000 in treatment).
3.2.1 Compulsory schooling
Our denition of compulsory schooling is standard. It increases schooling
in the population by setting a minimum age (period) for leaving school.
Formally, a policy intervention that dictates school attendance for the rst
x periods, sets
ds1i = ds2i = ::dsxi = 18i
and implies that individuals start optimizing at date t = x+ 1:
3.2.2 Education Subsidies
Each education subsidy consists of oering a reward conditional on attaining
a specic grade. We divide the schooling spectrum into 4 dierent levels:
Level 1 (grade 1 to 4), Level 2 (grade 5 to 8), Level 3 (grade 9 to 12), Level
4 (grade 13 onwards). For each level, we considered a per-period subsidy of
2 dollars.
3.2.3 Low-Skill Employment Subsidies
In order to enhance comparability between employment and schooling subsi-
dies, we consider an age-specic payment of two dollars paid over the follow-
19An alternative way to model it would be to allow for the existence of two (or more)
parallel education systems, dierentiated by their academic content (like in Germany).
See Belzil and Poinas, 2011, for a discussion.
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ing intervals; 1 to 4, 5 to 8, 9 to 12, and 13 to 16. The payment is conditioned
on being in state e.
3.3 The Distinction between Education Subsidies, Em-
ployment Subsidies and Compulsory Schooling
The key conceptual dierence between mandatory schooling and policies af-
fecting either the cost of schooling, or the utility of work, is that mandatory
schooling automatically aects the lower tail of the ability distribution. Sub-
sidies, even when paid at low schooling levels, may aect a much wider subset
of the population (Belzil and Hansen, 2010).20
Before comparing IV estimates, it is useful to provide a synthetic eco-
nomic analysis of those policy interventions. In Table 1, we report the frac-
tion of individuals aected by each policy intervention and two dierent
indicators of the skill dierential between those aected and unaected. The
indicators chosen are the average treatment eect of schooling (s); which
identies the individual specic factor (or type), and the ex-ante educational
attainment.
3.3.1 Education Subsidies
Upon examining the elements of Table 1, it is relatively straightforward to
evaluate the consequences of displacing the subsidy from Level 1 to Level
4. There are two essential features. First, the education subsidies oer a
monetary incentive conditional on reaching a specic level. In a sequential
framework (when consumption takes time), the eect of the intervention
is perceived through an option value, and is therefore aected by the rate
of time preference. Second, the actual claim of the incentive payment also
depends on individual skill heterogeneity.
Overall, there is evidence that the fraction aected decreases as the pay-
ment is delayed to higher levels, although the relationship is not perfectly
monotonic. For instance, when set at level 1, the subsidy aects 38.5% of
the population. When set at level 4, only 21.1% is aected. We also note
that the average ability of those aected is also increasing with the level of
20This may be explained intuitively by the fact that compulsory schooling may be gen-
erated by a subsidy (or cost) approaching minus (plus) innity.
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schooling upon which payment is conditioned. This is well illustrated by av-
erage treatment eect of schooling of those aected by the subsidy at Level
1, which is equal to 0.047, and is actually well below the population aver-
age. In turn, when the subsidy is paid conditional on reaching Level 4, those
aected have an average treatment eect close to 0.09, which is well above
population average.
3.3.2 Compulsory Schooling
Not surprisingly, implementing a set of compulsory schooling interventions
has completely dierent implications.
First, as the mandatory schooling level is manipulated from one year (its
minimum value) to four years, both the fraction of the population aected
and its average ability is expected to increase. This simply arises from the
fact that increasing the minimum by 1 year aects the extreme (bottom) tail
of the skill distribution, and that raising the minimum to 2, 3, and 4 years,
gradually recovers a larger set of the population. This is disclosed in Table
1, as the fraction aected ranges between 20.9% (1 year), and 50% (4 years),
and the average factor goes from 0.011 to 0.035.
However, the average level of ability of those aected is quite dierent
from what was observed for the education subsidies. To see this, it is infor-
mative to compare two distinct policies that aect a similar fraction of the
population. For instance, a comparison between the population aected by
a Level 1 subsidy ($2) and a 3-years compulsory schooling policy reveals a
huge ability gap, both in terms of the average treatment eect of schooling
(0.047 vs. 0.029) and in terms of ex-ante schooling (1.6 years vs 0.72).
3.3.3 Low-skill Employment Subsidies
Although employment subsidies are rarely used as instruments in the ap-
plied literature, they raise some theoretical interest. Unlike education sub-
sidies and mandatory schooling policies, work subsidies reduce schooling at-
tainments. However, they are not fundamentally dierent from education
subsidies, in that they achieve their goal by changing the relative price of
schooling with respect to labor market work.
As do education subsidies, both the identity of those aected, and the
fraction aected change with the age level at which it is implemented. Em-
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ployment subsidies paid in early age, aect 30% of the population. The
fraction goes to 8% for the subsidy paid between 5 and 8, 14.3% between 9
and 12, and 13.3% between age 13 and 16.
As the employment subsidy is delayed, the average ability of those aected
raises signicantly. The average eect of schooling among those aected by
the subsidy paid between one and four, is equal to 0.054 (a value somewhat
below population average), while the subsidy set between 13 and 16 aects
individual with very high academic abilities (the average is close to 0.09)
Employment subsidies tend to aect a set of individuals who are rela-
tively more able than those aected by education subsidies. However, the
dierences are far from being as large as those noted when we compared
either of those subsidies to mandatory schooling.
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Table 1
An Economic Analysis of Compulsory Schooling,
Education Subsidies,and Employment Subsidies
percentage Average factor (s) Education Ex-ante
aected aected unaected. aected unaected
Education Subsidies
Level 1/$2 38.5 0.047 0.068 1.617 9.499
Level 2/$2 16.6 0.065 0.059 3.909 6.975
Level 3/2$ 26.4 0.078 0.054 8.877 5.603
Level 4/2$ 21.1 0.088 0.052 12.554 4.840
Employment Subsidies
Age 1-4 29.9 0.054 0.063 2.992 8.387
Age 5-8 8.0 0.069 0.059 8.511 6.624
Age 9-12 14.3 0.082 0.056 12.434 5.827
Age 13-16 13.3 0.088 0.056 13.979 5.670
Mandatory Schooling
1 year 20.9 0.011 0.073 0.000 8.173
2 years 32.0 0.022 0.078 0.320 9.342
3 years 41.3 0.029 0.082 0.721 10.512
4 years 50.1 0.035 0.085 1.119 11.828
Note: Education ex-ante refers to the number of years schooling before
policy intervention.
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4 IV Estimates using Various Policy Inter-
ventions
We now proceed with cross-section IV estimation. To do so, we merge the
control group with each specic treatment groups. So, each IV estimate is
computed from a sample containing 100,000 individuals (50,000 for treat-
ment, 50,000 for control).
To be realistic, and in order to replicate what is usually achieved in the
empirical literature, we use data on earnings measured around the middle of
the life cycle interval devoted to labor market work. In the current model,
we set it to period 35.
In appendix Table A3, we report OLS regressions using simulated earnings
measured at 35. The estimate, equal to 0.11, is well above the population
parameter (0.06).21 This also conrms that the model is consistent with the
popular notion of positive Ability Bias, although the dierence between OLS
estimates and the population average is not solely due to unobserved ability.
Using standard vector notation, and dropping time subscripts, the IV
estimator is dened as
^s;IV = (Z
0S) 1Z 0W (8)
where W is a vector of log earnings, S is a vector of schooling attainments,
and Z is a treatment-control indicator.
Because our estimates are obtained for a cross-section of outcomes mea-
sured at a given date, our estimates are implicitly conditioning on age.22 For
the moment, we disregard identication, and remain agnostic with respect
to the population parameter that may be targeted by IV estimation.
The IV estimates are reported in Table 2. Along with standard errors,
we report the rst stage F-Statistic, and the correlations between Z and W ,
as well as Z and S:
Before providing an economic discussion, we review briey estimates
found in Table 2. The IV estimates obtained for various education subsi-
dies, range from 0.033 (Level 1) to 0.080 (Level 4). All of those estimates
21An OLS estimate of 0.11 is totally comparable to what would be obtained using
dierent cross-sections of the NLSY. See Belzil and Hansen, 2002.
22In the applied literature, most economists favor conditioning on age (as opposed to
experience) since work experience is usually considered endogenous.
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are relatively precise.23 As normally expected, and as we move from Level 1
to Level 4, the estimates increase with the average treatment eect of those
aected.
The results obtained for the instruments generated by employment sub-
sidies display a pattern that is not so dierent from those obtained from
the education subsidies, although they are slightly higher. For instance, the
estimates range from 0.038 to 0.096, and are all very signicant.
We now turn to the IV estimates obtained from compulsory schooling.
Those are found in the lower portion of Table 2. The most striking result
is the incidence of negative IV estimates. This is the case for both the one-
year and the two-years compulsory schooling policies. The estimates, equal
to -0.009 and -0.002, are actually comparable to many of those estimates
reported in the recent literature on compulsory schooling.24 All of them are
small in absolute value, although the compulsory schooling policy that sets
a minimum of 4 years generates an IV estimate (0.009) that is signicantly
dierent from 0. As a basis for comparison, the treatment eect for the sub-
population aected by a four-year mandatory schooling intervention is equal
to 0.035 (Table 1).
23We compute a standard error using 100 bootstrap replications.
24As noted in Belzil and Hansen (2010), in which earnings are drawn randomly between
period 15 and 55, the negativity of compulsory IV estimates prevail also when additional
controls for experience are introduced.
19
Table 2
IV Estimates for Various Policy Interventions
IV (st.error) F Statistic Corr(Z; S) Corr(Z;W )
Educ. Subsidies
Level 1/$2 0.033 (0.003) 550.0 0.074 0.0273
Level 2/$2 0.045 (0.002) 710.9 0.084 0.0420
Level 3/$2 0.055 (0.002) 637.5 0.080 0.0494
Level 4/$2 0.080 (0.004) 135.9 0.037 0.0326
Emp. Subsidies
Age 1-4 0.043 (0.004) 212.7 -0.046 -0.020
Age 5-8 0.054 (0.008) 57.7 -0.024 -0.013
Age 9-12 0.077 (0.006) 79.1 -0.028 -0.022
Age 13-16 0.128 (0.011) 35.2 -0.019 -0.024
Mand. Schooling
1 year -0.009 (0.017) 33.9 0.018 -0.0018
2 years -0.002 (0.006) 231.4 0.048 -0.0012
3 years 0.003 (0.002) 800.5 0.089 0.0030
4 years 0.009 (0.002) 2253.3 0.148 0.0137
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5 Comparative Advantages and Negative IV
Estimates
We now show how the incidence of negative IV estimates relates to the skill
formation technology.
5.1 Simulating Changes in Low-skill Job Productivity
At this stage, it is informative to analyze two more versions of the model
that dier only up to the value of e; namely a case where e = 0:005; and
another one where e = 0:030. We compare those two cases to our benchmark
model (in which e = 0:015): It is important to note that, as we move from
e = 0:005 to e = 0:030; we raise the productivity of one input to skill
formation (namely low-skill employment), without changing the rest.
Before proceeding further, and because our model entails an indirect ef-
fect of schooling on the likelihood of working in a high skill job, we also
evaluate the total eect. Basically, the indirect eect should measure the
portion of the yearly growth rate in earnings that is caused by schooling. To
approximate it, we evaluate the type (individual) and time specic quantity,
Ii (t); which we dene as
Ii (t) =
@ f
eEit+aAitg
Eit+Ait
@Sit
jtype i (9)
and which is measured at the same period as wage outcomes (period 35).25
The type specic values, which are reported in Appendix (Table A1), range
between 0.003 and 0.005 (depending on type). This means that, generally
speaking, the total eect of schooling exceeds si by half a percentage point
(or less).
To quantify the degree of comparative advantages that characterizes the
data generating processes, we consider the following index, denoted M(:)
M(e) =
1
N
NX
i=1
I(si + 
I
i < 
e) (10)
25To do so, we record simulated values of the numerator (for each individual belonging
to a given type) and regress it on schooling. Strictly speaking, the indirect eect should
be non-linear in schooling. However, for practical purpouses, we approximate it with a
linear relationship.
21
where I(:) is the indicator function, N is the population size, and where the
time subscript has been dropped. Basically, M(e) measures the fraction of
the population who is more eective at producing skills in the market (in
low-skill jobs) than in school. As we move from e = 0:005 to e = 0:030;
we gradually increase this fraction. The corresponding fractions are given
in Table 3.26 To illustrate the role of comparative advantages, we computed
the resulting IV estimates for all of those 3 cases. The results are found in
Table 3.
When the treatment eect of basic work experience is set to 0.005, the
set of individuals who produce more skills in a low-skill job is actually empty
since M( e = 0:005) = 0. In such a case, there is no way the policy can
aect a subset of the population more eective at producing skills in a low-
skill job, and mandatory schooling policies tend have a neutral (or positive)
eect on earnings. For instance, this is illustrated by the one year mandatory
schooling policy, which leads to an IV estimate of 0.004. Obviously, given
the low absolute value of this estimate, its degree of signicance raises no
interest.
As we progress toward a higher fraction of people more productive in the
market, the potential for negative IV estimates starts to set in. For instance,
with e = 0:015 (our benchmark model which has already been analyzed), the
fraction of the individuals more eective at work is now 0.10. However, this
does not mean that only individuals belonging to this group will be aected,
since stochastic shocks also play a role. Indeed, and as already noted in Table
1, the identity of those aected by a one-year policy (endowed with an average
s = 0:011) is consistent with a total eect of schooling approximately equal
to 0.015. This total eect is practically equal to e: So, in such a case, the
IV estimates are predicted to approach zero (recall that the estimates are
equal to-0.009 and -0.002 and are insignicant). Obviously, as the minimum
number of years is increased (to three or four years), the policy aects an
increasingly large number of individuals who are more eective in school. As
a consequence, IV estimates become more and more positive (recall that they
are equal to 0.003 and 0.009).
Let's now consider the model in which 25% of the population is more
eective in the market (e = 0:030). Because compulsory schooling aects
26Obviously, we could also measure M(:) in terms of si as opposed to 
s
i + 
I
i ; since
M(:) would still be increasing in e:
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the bottom tail, the majority of those aected is now more likely to be
composed of individuals who belong to this group. The claim is veried upon
examining the corresponding IV estimates. IV estimates remain negative up
to four years. For instance, a one-year mandatory schooling policy generates
an IV estimate equal to -0.017, and highly signicant. Equally, the two-years
and three-years compulsory schooling policies generate IV estimates that are
equal to -0.010 and -0.005, and are also signicantly dierent from zero.
This line of reasoning may also help explaining the positivity of IV es-
timates generated from education and work subsidies. For instance, the
identity of those aected by work subsidies (the middle portion of Table 1)
discloses that subsidizing low-skill jobs also entails a earnings depression,
since those aected tend to do better in academic activities. However, be-
cause the policy also reduces schooling, IV estimates remain positive. It is
interesting to note that, in this specic case, IV does not display the actual
sign of the eect of the policy on earnings.27
In order to verify that the negativity of IV is specic to compulsory
schooling, we have also re-examined IV estimates generated by those subsi-
dies implemented at low grade levels, when e = 0:005; and when e = 0:030:
To do so, we have implemented both the Level 1 and the Level 2 education
subsidies at each possible degree of comparative advantages used for manda-
tory schooling. The results are in the last two columns of Table 3. None of
the IV estimates generated from those education subsidies, ranging between
0.03 and 0.06 (and highly signicant) are even close to negativity. This is
explained by the fact that none of those policies actually aect the extreme
bottom tail, as was already noticed in Table 1.
As indicated earlier, we have ignored issues surrounding the precision of
IV estimates. This was dictated by the \economic" nature of our analysis.
The dierence between a policy engendering a signicantly negative eect,
and one engendering no eect, is mostly due to the identity of those aected.
The larger is the fraction of individuals who have comparative advantages
in low skill jobs (with respect to the population of compliers), the more
signicant (negative) will be the eect. However, in a stochastic model, the
presence of random shocks is sucient to prevent a perfect coincidence. So,
for this reason, the degree of statistical signicance of those policies do not
27In the applied literature, it is common for empiricists to claim that IV estimates a
"policy eect".
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raise immediate interest.28
5.2 An Interesting Paradox
Our analysis reveals an interesting paradox. As we increase the rate at which
low-skill jobs produce new skills (leaving both the distribution of treatment
eects of schooling, and the return to high-skill jobs unchanged), IV estimates
of compulsory schooling become increasingly negative. In particular, negative
IV estimates may arise even if each possible input (education, low-skill job
and high-skill job) has a strictly positive eect on skill formation.29
As an illustration, if technological changes increase the production of hu-
man capital induced by working in jobs that do not require academic ability,
we would expect mandatory schooling policies administered to successive
cohorts to display more and more negative values.
Strictly speaking, this paradox could also arise in the context where there
is no heterogeneity in the treatment eect of schooling. Suppose that all indi-
viduals share a common and convex the log-wage relationship, with marginal
(local) returns close to 0 in early grade levels and positive returns at higher
education levels (Belzil and Hansen, 2002).30 Suppose also that all individ-
uals face the same (strictly positive) return to accumulated experience, as
in a Mincer model. It follows that forcing individuals who have a high cost
of schooling (who would normally obtain low levels of schooling) to stay in
school for an extra year in school, would also reduce earnings as long as
their post-intervention schooling level remains in the region where the local
returns are close to 0.
28It should however be noted that, generally speaking, IV estimates may be imprecise,
even though its numerator (the correlation between wages and the policy shift indicator)
is itself signicantly dierent from 0. This actually turns out to be the case for many
mandatory schooling IV estimates reported in Table 3.
29It should also be clear that, although our results have been obtained from a framework
where the treatment eect of schooling is the only skill accumulation technology parameter,
similar results could be obtained while assuming cross-sectional heterogeneity in e. This
is the case, for instance, in Belzil and Hansen (2010).
30The term marginal (or local) return refers to the increment in earnings (log) from on
grade level to the next (see Belzil and Hansen, 2002).
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5.3 An Intuitive Explanation
Our results may also be presented from a purely intuitive angle. To do so,
assume away any indirect eect of schooling, and note that E(logwit j Zi =
1) E(logwit j Zi = 0); depends entirely on the earnings of those aected by
the intervention, since for those unaected, there is no dierence (on average)
between pre-intervention and post-intervention earnings. It follows that
E(logwit j Zi = 1)  E(logwit j Zi = 0) =
1
N
X
i2 A
(s
i2 A  fSi2 A;t j Zi = 1  Si2 A;t j Zi = 0g+ (11)
e  fEi2 At j Zi = 1  Ei2 At j Zi = 0g+
a  fAi2 At j Zi = 1  Ai2 At j Zi = 0g)
where N is population size, and where A denotes the set of individuals af-
fected by Z:
Any policy that raises schooling, implies that
s
i2 A  fSi2 A;t j Zi = 1  Si2 A;t j Zi = 0g > 0 (12)
and that either
e  fEi2 At j Zi = 1  Ei2 At j Zi = 0g < 0 (13)
or
a  fAi2 At j Zi = 1  Ai2 At j Zi = 0g < 0; (14)
or both (13) and (14).
However, when policy designers implement mandatory schooling, which
aects a very selective subset of the population, individual decisions are dis-
connected from comparative advantages. Those individuals who are endowed
with low returns to academic activities (those for whom s
i2 A  fSi2 A;t j Zi =
1 Si2 A;t j Zi = 0g  0) are forced to delay post-schooling skill accumulation.
In the particular case where the policy aects the extreme lower tail of the
ability distribution (those who may never or rarely invest in jobs requiring
academic skills), it is natural to expect Ai2 At j Zi = 1 = Ai2 At j Zi = 0:
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The eect of compulsory schooling on earnings then depends on the neg-
ativity of Ei2 At j Zi = 1   Ei2 At j Zi = 0: So, at any given point in time,
the dierence between treatment and control in the total amount of post-
schooling skills accumulated, namely
e  fEi2 At j Zi = 1  Ei2 At j Zi = 0g+ a  fAi2 At j Zi = 1  Ai2 At j Zi = 0g
(15)
is likely to be negative.
Table 3
IV Estimates with Dierent Degrees of Heterogeneity
in Skill Formation Technology
IV estimates (st.error)
Mandatory Schooling Education Subsidies
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years Level 1/$2 Level 2/$2
Model
e M(e)
0:005 0.0 0.004 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.043 0.057
(0.023) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
0:015 0.10 -0.009 -0.002 0.003 0.009 0.033 0.045
(0.017) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
0:030 0.25 -0.017 -0.010 -0.005 -0.0003 0.026 0.037
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Note: The fraction M(:) denotes the proportion of individuals who are
more productive at producing human capital in the market than in school.
26
6 Placing our Results in Perspective
Before concluding, it is important to place our analysis in a wider perspective.
As we claimed in introduction, our results provide a theoretical foundation
for a wide set of empirical results that have recently been reported in the
compulsory schooling literature, in the structural literature on estimating
distributions of returns to schooling, and in the literature on education and
growth.
However, at a more econometric level, our results may also be seen as
complementary to those established by Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), and
discussed in Heckman,Vytlacil and Urzua (2007), and Heckman (2010). So,
for the sake of completeness, we briey address the issue at the end of the
section.
6.1 The Recent Literature on Compulsory Schooling
One of the most striking developments in the recent empirical literature is the
incidence of low, and even negative, IV estimates obtained from compulsory
schooling reforms. Devereux and Hart (2010) analyze the increase in the
compulsory schooling age from 14 to 15, which took place in the UK, in 1947.
The authors report IV estimates that are actually close to 0.31 In a more
recent working paper, Chib and Jacobi (2011), using UK General Household
Surveys, also analyze this policy change. Although their approach is slightly
dierent from Devereux and Hart (2010), they also nd evidence of very low
IV estimates. Indeed, some of the estimates reported are actually negative
(around -0.003).32
Pischke and von Wachter (2008) also report estimates of the return to
raising the minimum school leaving age in the former West Germany that
are very close to zero. The incidence of very low (and negative) IV estimates
is also reported in Grenet (2010), who analyzes the eects of a reform that
raised the minimum schooling age in France in 1967, using the French Labor
Force Survey.33
31Cameron and Taber (2004) present several arguments that may explain why low esti-
mates of the returns to schooling tended not to get reported for a long time.
32Chib abd Jacobi (2011) use Bayesian fuzzy regression discontinuity methods.
33Other relevant studies are surveyed in Devereux and Hart (2010).
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Despite the multiplicity of low returns, none of those studies actually
provide any structural (theoretical) interpretation of the incidence of negative
IV estimates. As of now, the prevalence of low (or negative) IV estimates
is regarded as a puzzle.34 As should be clear by now, the incidence of low
(possibly negative) IV estimates generated from educational interventions
targeting the bottom tail of the ability distribution, is a natural implication
of the existence of comparative advantages. Essentially, IV estimates are
bound to lie below zero as long as those individuals, who are more eective
at producing skills in the market than in school, are also those aected by
the policy. This is the case with compulsory schooling interventions, but
generally not with other interventions.
6.2 Comparative Advantages and the Distribution of
Returns to Schooling
In the structural literature on estimating distributions of returns to schooling
(Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman, 2003, and Heckman, Humphries, Urzua
and Veramendi, 2011), earnings equations are usually specied as a Roy
model. Using our notation, and in the specic case where the model does
not incorporate any control for age or experience, the object estimated by
the econometrician boils down to the population distribution of the following
quantity:
Ex-post returnsi =
@fsi  S + e  E + a  Ag
@S
(16)
Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) and Heckman, Humphries, Urzua
and Veramendi (2011), report a substantial fraction of individuals who ex-
perience negative ex-post returns to schooling.35 Depending on the model
specication considered, the fraction is close to 20% . It is interesting to note
that this number is also consistent with results reported in Belzil and Hansen
34This may be partly explained by the fact that empirical labor economists often inter-
pret their estimates within the static Becker model (Becker, 1964), in which individuals
no longer accumulate skills beyond schooling. The Becker model is used by Card (1999)
in his survey of the IV literature on returns to schooling.
35The term \ex-post returns" is used to characterize the parameters of the actual earn-
ings data generating process. In the presence of imperfect information, individuals may
base their schooling decisions on a dierent set of parameters which reect the information
available at the time of schooling decisions.
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(2007) who nd that between 20% and 25% of the population analyzed (US
males sampled from the NLSY 79) is endowed with an individual specic
treatment eect of schooling inferior to the early career return to general ex-
perience. Although the model is set within a classical Mincer framework (the
post-schooling accumulation rate is exogenous), this is an indication that the
parameters used to calibrate our model are actually realistic.
As seen earlier, our model provides a structural foundation for the exis-
tence of negative ex-post returns to schooling, even if each possible input (ed-
ucation, low-skill job and high-skill job) has a strictly positive eect on skill
formation. Although the set of individuals aected by compulsory schooling
may not be exactly coincident with the set of individuals characterized by
M(:) because individuals are subject to random shocks, negative IV estimates
obtained in the compulsory schooling literature are the mirror image of the
existence of negative ex-post returns to schooling within a Roy model. That
is as we increase (counterfactually) the rate at which low-skill jobs produce
new skills (ceteris paribus), ex-post returns to schooling become negative for
an increasing fraction of the population.
6.3 Education and Growth
Although our model is not directly concerned with growth, it still provides
a theoretical foundation for the very weak (or negative) correlation data
between economic growth and education, documented in the empirical lit-
erature. In this literature, economists attempt to capture the causal eect
of education on growth rates, after controlling for cross-country dierences
in capital stock, and well as other factors aecting it. Following Bils and
Klenow (2000), many economists have reported very weak, and sometimes
negative, estimates of the eect of education on growth.36
The empirical analysis is typically achieved using panel data of countries
that have experienced, for the most part, expansions in their education sys-
tem. The eect of education is identied by the co-movements of schooling
levels of successive cohorts, and their associated growth rates in GNP.
However, returning to our model, the source of a given education expan-
sion may have a non-neutral eect on growth. While countries that have ex-
perienced changes in education through incentive-based policies, are likely to
36The literature is surveyed in Sunde and Vischer (2011).
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experience positive changes in earnings across cohorts, this is not necessarily
true of those that have increase schooling by changes in compulsory school-
ing. Those countries who have experienced expansion in average schooling
levels by successive changes in compulsory schooling, are much more likely
to experience a modest growth rate, since economic growth induced by other
factors (technology, population growth, etc..) is likely mitigated by those ed-
ucation policies. In the extreme case where a large fraction of the population
is more eective at producing skills in the market, negative eect cannot be
ruled out.
As far as we know, the mechanisms underlying education expansion across
cohorts have not been considered in the empirical growth literature. Taken
as such, our model leads us to believe it should. After all, even if it does
not incorporate capital investments and technological changes, it neverthe-
less singles out an eect of education policies that holds, other things held
constant. The eect of education on growth has been at the forefront of the
empirical literature for many years and, most likely, it will continue to be so
in the future.
6.4 The Literature on IV Estimation of Treatment Ef-
fects
Although the focus of the paper was not on point estimation of the skill for-
mation technology parameters, it is possible to draw some analogies with the
literature on estimating treatment eects. In a series of papers, which include
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and Heckman, Vytlacil and Urzua (2007), the
authors express IV as a weighted average of Local average Treatment eects
and show that within a Roy model, potential misspecication of the rst
stage model may induce negative IV weights, which in turn may lead to IV
estimates having the opposite sign of the treatment eect of interest.
To some extent, the incidence of negative IV estimates coexisting with
strictly positive eects of each input to skill formation, displays some com-
monalities with those issues raised by Heckman, Vytlacil and Urzua. How-
ever, the problem is not about choosing the right specication of the rst-
stage model, but about the specication of the outcome equation. Because
our outcome equation is more general than the one analyzed in Heckman
and Vytlacil (2005) and in Imbens and Angrist (1994), the independence as-
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sumption (necessary for identifying a treatment eect) is violated.37 Indeed,
none of the existing treatment eects (treatment for the treated, treatment
for the untreated, population average treatment eect, or local average treat-
ment eect) may be viewed as the estimand corresponding to negative IV
estimates.38
To summarize, IV actually estimates a quantity that depends directly on
the dierence between two dierent structural parameters, and not on their
level. So, the paradox described in the previous sub-section is a consequence
of the failure of the IV identifying moment condition, which itself follows
from the misspecication of the earnings equation.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have examined the implications of the existence of comparative advan-
tages in human capital production, within a life cycle framework. Our model
helps reconciling a large number of ndings in the vast and heterogenous
literature devoted to the economic benet of schooling. As illustrated in the
paper, changes in the rate at which skills are produced in the labor mar-
ket may have a pivotal force on (i) the sign of IV estimates generated from
education interventions that target the bottom tail of the skill distribution,
on (ii) the measured density of a given population endowed with negative
ex-post returns, and on (iii) the eect of education on economic growth.
The implications of comparative advantages go far beyond what we cov-
ered in the paper. Many countries, in which higher education is heavily
subsidized, are currently contemplating education reforms that may favor
the development of professional education system, as a substitute for higher
education enrollment.39 We claim that the eectiveness of those policies
is also highly dependent on the actual fraction of the relevant population
endowed with comparative advantages in labor market work.
37Vytlacil (2000) proved that the LATE framework of Imbens and Angrist (1994) is
equivalent to a non-parametric version of the Roy model.
38For instance, in Belzil and Hansen (2011), we perform a similar analysis on a cross-
section of earnings that is representative of most data sets used empirical work. As earnings
are measured at dieret points in time between early career and retirement, we can also
perform IV regressions that control for experience. The results remain practically identical.
39This is the case for Switzerland and France, among others. See Belzil and Poinas
(2011) for a discussion
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More generally, evaluating the eectiveness of any education policy re-
quires the knowledge of the full skill formation technology, and in particular,
knowledge of the fraction of the population who are more eective at produc-
ing skills in the market than in school. Surprisigly, this objective has been
ignored by most empirical labor economists who, for more than 30 years,
have focussed almost entirely on the point estimation of the treatment eect
of schooling using natural experiments and the like. On the other hand, the
estimation of life cycle human capital accumulation behavior models allowing
for comparative advantages is still in its infancies. We believe that its future
development is essential to the comprehension of a wide class of education
policies.
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Table A1
The Heterogeneity Distribution
S s s + 
I
i c
a
0 proportion
type
1 -2.990 0.005 0.009 9.955 0.05
2 -2.750 0.005 0.009 9.895 0.10
3 -1.790 0.015 0.019 8.695 0.10
4 -1.310 0.023 0.028 8.215 0.10
5 -0.470 0.035 0.040 7.375 0.05
6 0.130 0.044 0.049 6.775 0.05
7 0.550 0.050 0.055 6.355 0.05
8 0.844 0.055 0.061 6.061 0.05
9 1.324 0.062 0.067 5.581 0.05
10 1.570 0.066 0.070 5.335 0.05
11 2.050 0.073 0.079 4.855 0.05
12 2.530 0.080 0.086 4.375 0.05
13 2.770 0.084 0.089 4.135 0.05
14 3.010 0.087 0.093 3.895 0.05
15 3.250 0.091 0.097 3.655 0.05
16 3.484 0.094 0.102 3.421 0.05
17 3.964 0.102 0.108 2.941 0.05
Mean 1.188 0.060 5.717 -
St Dev. 2.062 0.031 2.062 -
Note: The term, Ii ;which is equal to
@
feEit+aAitg
Eit+Ait
@Sit
; denotes the indirect
eect of schooling on post-schooling earnings growth. It is a measure of non-
separability between schooling and experience and is measured at t = 35:
37
Table A2
Life Cycle Choices in the Control Group:
Common Slope Model
Accumulated number of periods in each State
In School work Work
(learning ) (Training)
year
1 0.791 0.209 0.000
10 5.267 4.733 0.010
20 6.503 12.554 0.943
30 6.503 21.914 1.583
40 6.503 29.150 4.347
50 6.503 37.185 6.311
Table A3
OLS Regressions
Model
intercept 0.563
(0.012)
education 0.113
(0.0002)
experience 0.036
(0.001)
experience2 -0.0002
 0
R2 0.52
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